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ABSTRACT
This study investigates voluntary demand for auditing by Australian
farm businesses, a significant but relatively unexplored segment of the
economy. Most farms operate as family partnerships or sole
proprietors and we thus focus on incentives to audit arising from
internal sources (owner-manager), controlling for traditional
incentives arising from external contractual constraints (i.e., debt),
organisational characteristics (i.e., size), and agency conflict. We
hypothesise that an external audit assists management in enhancing
internal control by complementing the process of profit planning and
control (budgeting) and that increased family conflict provides an
incentive to engage external audit. Of the 457 survey questionnaire
respondents, 27% voluntarily engage an external auditor and 66%
conduct some formal written planning. Results from logistic regression
analyses support the predicted impact of both size and debt on audit,
and further support the hypothesised impact of budgeting. The positive
association between budgeting and audit confirms the complementary
relationship. More importantly, this relationship is not confounded by
the combined impact of size and budgeting and debt and budgeting on
voluntary audit. In addition, family conflict has no impact on voluntary
demand for auditing by farm business.
Audit, budgeting, planning, farming, agency theory
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INTRODUCTION
This study investigates voluntary demand for auditing by owner managed farm
enterprises, a significant but relatively unexplored segment of the economy in the
accounting literature. Based on the most recent statistics, the Australian Bureau of
Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences ABARES (2012) estimates
that approximately 11.5 per cent ($36.4 billion) of total exports is attributable to
agricultural products, while the Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates that there
are around 135,600 agricultural businesses in Australia (ABS, 2010) employing
approximately 306,700 people in 2010-11 (ABS, 2012).  In the present study we
focus on small and medium size owner managed farm enterprises, as these are the
predominant structure in Australia (ABS, 2003). Most Australian farms are family
partnerships or sole proprietors with only a fraction operating as large public
enterprises (Wright & Kane 1997). Lloyd and Malcom (1997) explain that because
of cost advantages over both small and large farms, the typical Australian farm
enterprise is of medium size and operated by a couple plus some casual labour and
in other cases a permanent employee.1 Despite the importance of farming to the
economy, few empirical studies have investigated the use of accounting by farm
businesses (see Argiles, 2001; Luening, 1989), and to the best of the authors’
knowledge no study has considered demand for external auditing by owner-
managed farms.
Farm businesses provide a unique environment to study demand for auditing
because it is possible to eliminate the impact of both the statutory requirement to
audit and agency conflict; and thus focus on incentives arising from internal
sources (i.e., owner-manager), while controlling for contractual constraints (i.e.,
lenders) and organisational characteristics (i.e., size). Prior research investigating
voluntary demand for auditing has focused on contractual constraints expected to
increase the likelihood of a business engaging the services of an auditor, in
particular lender constraints (e.g., Chow, 1982; Abdel-khalik, 1993; Blackwell et
al.,1998; Carey et al., 2001; Allee & Yohn, 2009), agency conflict (e.g., Chow,
1982; Carey et al., 2001; Hope et al., 2012), or voluntary demand arising from the
size of the organization (e.g., Chow, 1982; Abdel-khalik, 1993; Blackwell et al.,
1998; and Carey et al., 2001).
Chow et al. (1988) argue that internal management is a further source of demand
for audit. This argument follows Wallace’s (1980) contention that audited financial
information can improve the financial data used by managers internally. Indeed,
Indjejikian and Matejka (2009) provide support for this contention and find that
high-quality attested financial information is relevant for evaluation of managerial
performance and compensation. Meanwhile, assuming that loss of control is caused
by reduced observability in hierarchies, thus giving rise to risk of moral hazard and
opportunism, Abdel-khalik (1993) seeks to explain the benefit of external auditing
to owner-managers as a way of compensating for ‘loss of control’ associated with
increased organizational hierarchy. His study finds that number of employees
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(proxy for hierarchy) is associated with external audit for the 103 owner-managed
private companies (Abdel-khalik, 1993).2
Accordingly, the current study investigates the incentive to audit arising from
internal management where it is argued that a financial statement audit
complements the firm’s system of control. Controlling for factors traditionally
associated with demand for auditing (i.e., debt and size) in an environment where
there is little to no agency conflict, we propose that an owner-manager might
demand an external audit to complement profit planning and control (budgeting).
An audit will enhance the credibility of financial information used in the budgeting
process and the auditor’s expertise provides the owner manager with an
opportunity to learn and improve processes.
The incentives for an owner-manager to voluntarily engage in budgeting will
therefore indirectly explain demand for auditing. Factors found to be associated
with budgeting include size (e.g., Aram & Cowen, 1990), debt, internal locus of
control (Begley & Boyd, 1987; Miller & Toulouse, 1986; Miller et al., 1982) and
environmental uncertainty (Matthews, 1991; Bracker & Pearson 1986; and
Bourgeois, 1985). Our study therefore examines the association between budgeting
and farm size, debt, the owner manager’s internal locus of control and
environmental uncertainty.
An additional contribution of this study is to investigate whether personal conflict
between owner-managers explains demand for auditing. As previously stated, most
Australian farms are owned and managed by families. Adapting the agency
theoretical argument, prior research conjectures that personal conflict between
family members might provide further incentive to engage the monitoring service
of external audit (see Carey et al., 2001).  Accordingly, we investigate the impact
of family conflict on voluntary demand for auditing.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Prior research finds that in owner managed firms, voluntary demand for auditing is
positively associated with the level of debt (Hope et al., 2011; Carey et al., 2001;
Abdel-Khalik, 1993) and that a benefit from external auditing is that owner-
managed firms pay a lower interest rate to banks on unsecured loan facilities
(Blackwell et al., 1998). Research findings suggest that lenders encourage and/or
impose a regime to audit. In an environment where audit is voluntary, lenders
extract penalties (e.g., higher interest rates) should the owner choose not to engage
financial statement audit services.
Research investigating voluntary demand for external auditing has predicted that
contractual incentives associated with non-owner managers (agency conflict) is
positively correlated with auditing (e.g., Chow, 1982). For private or family
controlled companies, the level of agency conflict and thus audit demand is found
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to be associated with the level of outside management and/or ownership (Carey et
al., 2001).
Contractual incentives associated with the level of firm debt and agency conflict
assume that audited information is used to monitor performance. The professional
auditing standards recognise that a financial statement audit opinion enhances the
credibility of a financial report (see AUS 202, 2004, paragraph 03) and this
information is used to monitor performance. However, in addition to incentives
arising from external regulatory requirements or to satisfy contractual constraints,
demand for auditing might also be derived from the firms’ internal sources (see
Indjejikian & Matejka, 2009 and Chow et al., 1988).
With regard to owner-managed firms, Abdel-khalik (1993) argues that in addition
to lender requirements, the value of an audit is to assist the owner manager control
of the business.3 When the business is small, owner managers control operations by
means of direct supervision. However, as the business grows larger, delegation of
responsibility gives rise to slippage in the effectiveness of command and control.
This “loss of control thesis” suggests the value of an audit is in assisting the owner
manager monitor the quality and adequacy of the system of internal control for
management.4 While intuitive, the prediction has limited empirical support based
around a correlation between size (number of employees) and the audit fee and
interviews with a small number of owner managers. The process by which the
auditor enhances the control system remains unclear.
In this study it is argued that an external audit can enhance internal control through
its impact on the budgeting process. Mintzberg (1981, 1994) argues that an
organization can be said to plan to the extent that it uses formalized procedures to
make and integrate its decisions and then articulates results. Welsh et al. (1988)
describe budgeting (or Profit Planning and Control) as a process designed to help
managers effectively perform significant phases of the planning and control
function.
Two explanations for the proposed association between audit and budgeting are
provided. First, a financial statement audit will enhance the credibility of financial
information used in the organization’s budgeting process. By lending credibility to
financial information, the audit enhances the quality of information used in (i)
setting financial goals or standards and (ii) assessing or measuring performance. As
the budgeting process becomes more sophisticated, there is greater incentive on
owner/managers to engage the services of an auditor to ensure the credibility of
information used in the budgeting process.5 Second, adapted from Chenhall and
Morris (1993), who describe ‘post completion audits’ as feedback mechanisms
providing information to evaluate efficiency in the implementation of investment
projects and in assessing the accuracy of basic assumptions about such projects, we
contend that the auditors’ expertise and knowledge provide the owner manager
with an opportunity to learn and improve processes via this feedback loop. The
auditor’s evaluation of the system of internal controls is likely to facilitate an
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objective assessment of the farm’s financial goals and standards and provides a
performance feedback mechanism by which the owner manager is able to assess
congruence between the budget strategy and outcomes.
1.1 Budgeting
The incentives for an owner manager to voluntarily engage in budgeting provide
the backdrop for indirectly explaining demand for auditing. By understanding
precisely which antecedents have an impact on budgeting will assist in explaining
demand for voluntary audits. In addition, an understanding of these antecedents
will also determine which variable(s), combined with budgeting, should be
specified in relation to voluntary audit, that is, which third variable potentially
provides a moderating influence on the association between budgeting and demand
for audit, thus obviating model misspecification as well as confounding residual
effects. Accordingly, the budgeting literature is briefly reviewed and some of the
antecedents of budgeting are synthesized.
The extent to which the owner managed farm business utilizes the formal
budgeting process as an internal control mechanism is unexplored. There is
considerable research by management accountants investigating the link between
budgeting and performance and factors that might moderate this link (Shield,
1997). Normative models of management accounting prescribe that budgeting
contributes positively to the resource allocation process (e.g., Horngren et al.,
2011), but to the best of the authors’ knowledge there is a paucity of accounting
research outlining factors associated with budgeting.
However, there is an abundance of studies in the management literature that
examine budgeting (i.e., both operational and strategic), and this process is
primarily researched in the context of contingency theory and resource dependence
(see Pearce et al., 1987; Schwenk & Shrader, 1993).  These theories argue that a
firm’s survival is dependent on its ability to adapt successfully to a changing
environment, and provide deterministic explanations of organisational phenomena
through structural factors (e.g., Perrow, 1970) such as technology and environment
on the one hand, and explanations of organisational phenomena through the
personalities (e.g., internal locus of control) and capacities of owner-managers
(e.g., Miller et al., 1982; Miller & Toulouse, 1986) on the other hand.
Research (e.g., Bourgeois, 1980, 1985; Lindsay & Rue, 1980) also shows that
environmental uncertainty impacts on decision making and planning.  For example,
Lindsay and Rue (1980) found that large firms increase planning in the face of
turbulent environments, whereas Matthews (1991) found that small firms prefer to
plan under low uncertainty. Correspondingly, Robinson and Pearce (1984) argued
that, owing to resource constraints and limited strategic options, small enterprises
are less likely to plan, particularly in turbulent times.
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Thus the current study examines the association between budgeting and the
variables size (LnSIZE) and debt (DEBT), budgeting and personal characteristics
such as internal locus of control (INLC) and family conflict (FAMCONF), as well
environmental uncertainty (ENUN1) (see Appendix A).  These variables have been
chosen in an attempt to determine which combination of environmental and firm-
specific variables will provide adequate explanations for voluntary demand for
budgeting.
1.2 Hypotheses
Undertaking an analysis of voluntary demand for auditing among farm businesses
allows for the identification of incentives arising from internal sources (owner
manager). This study suggests that a potential benefit of external audit is to
enhance internal control, specifically the budgeting process. A positive correlation
between the sophistication of the budgeting process and external auditing is
predicted. Thus the preceding argument is summarized in the following hypothesis:
H1: In an unregulated farm business environment, demand for auditing will be
positively associated with profit planning and control (budgeting).
Derived from predictions in agency theory, we argue that personal conflict between
owner-managers might explain demand for external audit. As previously stated,
most farms are owned and managed by families, and conflict between family
members might drive demand for monitoring and control. Prior research
conjectured that personal conflict between family members might provide further
incentive to engage the monitoring service of external audit (see Hope et al., 2012;
Carey et al., 2001). Accordingly we predict that more strained personal relations
between family members will provide an incentive to engage external audit. The
preceding argument is summarized in the following hypothesis
H2: In an unregulated farm business environment, voluntary demand for auditing
will be positively associated with conflict among farm owners.
2. DATA AND METHODS
2.1 Data Collection Procedure and Sample
Data subject to analysis comprised 457 Australian farm businesses drawn from a
database of 748 broadacre and dairy farms compiled for a larger national study of
farm management practices.6 This national survey, which randomly selected 4,080
farm establishments on the basis of Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 1996-97
annual listing of key characteristics and industry information (i.e., farm
establishments with an estimated value of agricultural operations of $22,500 or
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more were selected by state and sector), was conducted by the Family Business
Research Unit, Monash University in 1999-2000.7
The national study used a questionnaire which comprised eight sections: Strategic
and Operational Planning, Risk and Uncertainty, Farm Business Objectives,
Business and Life Outcomes, Entrepreneurship, Family Functioning, Background
of Farm Business, and Farm Owner Characteristics.  This paper reports findings
drawn from four sections of the questionnaire: Background of Farm Business,
Strategic and Operational Planning, Business and Life Outcomes, and Family
Functioning.  Background of Farm Business assesses factors including the farm
industry type, state in which the establishment resides; current value of farm;
annual average change in total assets over 5 years; total income; current level of
gearing; whether the farm establishment was a family farm; age of farm; generation
of ownership; number of full-time employees; amount of dollars spent on casual
employees’ wages; whether farm business is subject to an annual financial report
audit; and, major reasons for conducting an audit. Strategic and Operational
Planning gauges the sophistication of business planning conducted by farm owners.
Business and Life Outcomes measures the farm owner’s internal locus of control,
whereas Family Functioning assesses the extent of communication in family
relationships.
Tests of responses revealed that respondents are comparable to the ABS population
statistics for five of the six states, and for four of the six industries. Respondents
are under-represented in New South Wales as well as in the wheat & other crops,
and beef industries. Further comparisons against other ABS distributional data,
such as education, age, and gender suggest that the sample is comparable to the
population. Moreover, comparisons of average total income and average asset
value of farm figures with those compiled by Australasian Agribusiness Services
(1997) also suggest comparability.
Respondents confirmed that most Australian farms are family managed and
controlled employing few staff. Over 88% of respondents view their farm as a
family farm, and 92.4% indicate that more than 50% of the farm’s share capital is
owned by the family. Similarly, 88.7% of respondents indicate that they make
more than 80% of farm management decisions. Of the 7.6% non-family owned
farm enterprises, 0.2% are publicly owned. Approximately 53% of broadacre farm
businesses have full-time employees, with the average having one full-time farm
employee. However, 26.7% of farms indicate that they employ two or more full-
time employees, and of these, only 5.5% employ four or more full-time employees.
The median expenditure on casual employee wages for the financial year ending
30th June 1999 is $4,000, with average casual wages highest for the sheep ($14,
813) and mixed livestock-crops ($10,963) industries. Farm enterprises are largely
free from agency conflict arising from the separation of ownership and control
typical in listed public companies and among many private companies.
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The typical family farm business has been owned for 58 years, with the age of
farms ranging from one to 170 years. Median size of farms is 781.5 hectares, with
the primary business activity being mixed livestock (35.7%), followed by sheep-
beef producers (14.7%), beef (14.0%), and dairy farmers (13.6%). Reported
median value of properties is approximately $0.8 million, with total farm income
averaging approximately $284,000. The average gearing ratio of broadacre and
dairy farmers is 20.4% (median 20%), ranging from 0% to a gearing ratio of 100%.
Approximately 35% of farmers indicate gearing of 10% or less, an additional 40%
a ratio of between 11 and 20%, and 25% gearing greater than 20%.
From the database of 748 broadcare and dairy farms, 291 businesses were deleted
for the following reasons: (1) 97 responses were deleted to eliminate the potentially
confounding effect of a regulatory requirement to audit; (2) two deleted to
eliminate the effect of contractual requirements to audit; and (3) the remaining 192
responses were deleted where there were missing values for any one of the
variables in the model. To assess whether deleted respondents differed significantly
to our usable response group (n=457), they were compared on three key
characteristics (i.e., current value of farm, total income, state, and industry).
Independent samples t-tests indicate that there were no systematic differences
between the two groups on current value of farm (t = 0.95, df = 746, p = 0.3410)
and total income (t = 1.46, df = 746, p = 0.1450).  Similarly, chi-square tests
similarly reflect no systematic differences between the two groups on state
characteristics (2 = 8.84, df = 5, p = 0.1155), but significant differences exist
between the two groups on industry characteristics (2 = 12.99, df = 5, p = 0.0235),
suggesting that sheep farmers were under-represented in this study.
2.2 Model Specification and Variables
A logistic regression analysis was used to predict discrete outcomes (i.e., to
determine the probability of whether a farm business was subject to an annual
financial report audit or not) on the basis of three continuous variables and one
ordinal explanatory variable. The model was estimated to assess prediction of
farms’ voluntarily adopting an audit on the basis of size of farm business
(LNSIZE), gearing (DEBT), budgeting (PLAN2), and family conflict
(FAMCONF).
where,
AUDIT is a dichotomous variable, where 1 = the farm business is subject
to an annual financial report audit, 0 = Otherwise;
)1(1ln 20 uXXXXAuditP
P
FamConfPlanDebtLnSize 


 
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LnSIZE is measured by the value of the farm’s total assets, which includes
land, buildings, livestock, supplies and equipment. A transformed
measure of farm size (using the natural log) was included in the
logistic regression analyses;
DEBT is a measure of the farm’s gearing, defined as the proportion of a
farm’s total sales price retained after all debts had been paid;
PLAN2 is a composite variable comprising 6 items measured on an ordinal
scale with the following classification: No Planning, Some
Informal Unwritten Planning, Some Formal Written Planning, and
Sophisticated Formal Written Planning. Adapted from Matthews
and Scott (1995), it assesses the extent and sophistication of
operational planning practiced by farm owners. Examples of items
are: Budgets are developed for cashflow and Budgets are better
developed for equipment purchases. Internal level of consistency
for Budgeting is  = 0.87;
FAMCONF is a 10-item composite measure of family conflict, which
primarily gauges the extent of misunderstanding, interference, and
difficulty in solving problems and making plans within a family
unit. Adapted from Noller, Seth-Smith, Bouma, and Schweitzer
(1992), items are measured on 6-point Likert scales ranging from
1=Totally Disagree to 6=Totally Agree.  The reliability coefficient
is α = 0.82.
In addition to the logistic regression model described above, ordinal responses (No
Planning, Some Informal Unwritten Planning, Some Formal Planning, and
Sophisticated Formal Planning for budget planning) were predicted on the basis of
five continuous variables and one dummy explanatory variable. Thus the second
model assessed prediction of budget planning using an ordinal response logistic
regression on the basis of size of farm business (SIZE), gearing (DEBT), internal
locus of control (INLC), family conflict (FAMCONF), operational uncertainty
(ENUN1) and whether the farm was subject to an annual financial statement audit
(AUDIT).
where,
INLC is a 7-item instrument that measures the farm owner’s internal locus
of control (e.g., Working out the strengths of my farm business in
some detail can often give me useful leads for the future).  Adapted
from Kaine et al. (1998), it assesses the degree of control people
believe they have over their environment, and relates to beliefs about
behavior, success, and failure. This measure was specifically
 
)2(
2)|(log
1
0
uXX
XXXXPLANxjPit
AUDITENUN
FAMCONFINLCDEBTLnSIZE
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designed for mixed-farming operations such as broadacre and dairy
farming. Assessed on 6-point Likert scales ranging from 1=Totally
Disagree to 6=Totally Agree, the internal consistency is α = .73.
ENUN1 is an 8-item measure, adapted from Matthews and Scott (1995, pp.
41-42), which assesses owners’ perceptions of environmental or
state uncertainty. That is, the ability of owners to understand or to
predict the state of the operational environment within the context of
limited information. Items (e.g., obtaining resources such as
equipment) are measured on 6-point Likert scales ranging from
0=N/A; 1=Very Low Certainty to 5=Very High Certainty, and the
internal consistency of operational uncertainty is α = .82;
and all other variables are as defined above.
3. RESULTS
3.1 Descriptive Results – Audit
Table 1 presents a basic summary of the survey results. Of the 457 observations,
121 (26%) farm establishments voluntarily engaged in an annual financial
statement audit and 336 (74%) did not. The predominant reason offered by farm
owners for conducting an audit was lender requirement (56%), followed by owner
requirement (30%), and “other” (14%). Panel A in Table 2 presents basic
univariate statistics. A univariate comparison of farm establishments revealed
significant differences (SIZE (t(423) = -2.73, p <0.007) and DEBT (t(444) = 3.91,
p <0.000)) in the expected direction for the two measures capturing size and debt
of the farm business. As hypothesized, the level of gearing (DEBT) was higher for
farm businesses that indicated Yes to an audit ( %08.26X ) compared with
farms that indicated No to an external audit ( %19.18X ). With regard to farm
size (SIZE), group comparisons revealed farm establishments that engaged an audit
were significantly larger than farm businesses that did not ( 013,722,1$X
versus 409,262,1$X , respectively).
A significant difference was observed for budget planning on demand for audit
(t(450) = -5.68, p <0.000), but no significant difference was observed for family
conflict (t(404) = -0.65, p > 0.05). These results suggest that farm owners who
conduct more sophisticated business planning ( 44.3X ) are more likely to
demand an audit compared with owners who conduct less sophisticated business
planning ( 73.2X ), whereas family conflict does not have an impact on their
decision to conduct an audit.
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Table 1. A Summary of Survey Results - Farm Businesses’ Demand for Audit
and Budgeting (Planning)
Farm Businesses’ Demand for Audit
AUDIT
NO YES TOTAL
TOTAL 336 (73.5%) 121 (26.4%) 457
Farm Businesses’ Demand for Budgeting (Planning)
PLAN2
f %
No Planning 25 5.5%
Some Informal 143 31.8%
Some Formal 133 29.6%
Sophisticated 149 33.1%
Total 457 100.0%
Farm Businesses Demand for Audit by Demand for Budgeting (Planning)
AUDIT
BUDGETING NO YES TOTAL
No Planning 24 1 25 (5.6%)
Some Informal 107 36 143 (31.8%)
Some Formal 78 55 133 (29.6%)
Sophisticated 92 57 149 (33.1%)
Total 301 (66.9%) 149 (33.1%) 450 (100.0%)
Table 2. Univariate Statistics - Demand for Audit and Budgeting (Planning)
Panel A: Audit
Variablesa
All
Observations
(n = 457)
Yes
Demand
an Audit
(n = 121)
No
Demand
an Audit
(n = 336)
t-Value
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
SIZE
DEBT
PLAN2
FAMCONF
$1,421,378
($1,466,487)
20.86%
(19.71%)
2.97 (1.38)
2.39 (0.84)
$1,722,013
($1,845,032)
26.08%
(21.94%)
3.44 (1.14)
2.43 (0.85)
$1,262,409
($1,193,441)
18.19%
(19.19%)
2.73 (1.43)
2.37 (0.84)
-2.73 (p < 0.007)
3.91 (p < 0.000)
-5.68 (p <0.000)
-0.65 (p > 0.05)
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Panel B: Budget Planning
Variablesa
All
Observations
(n = 418)
No
Planning
(n = 22)
Some
Informal
Planning
(n = 131)
Some
Formal
Planning
(n = 123)
Sophisticate
d Planning
(n = 142)
F-Value
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
SIZE
DEBT
INLC
FAMCON
F
ENUN1
$1,421,378
($1,466,487)
20.4%
(19.71%)
4.19 (0.76)
2.39 (0.84)
3.59 (0.99)
$802,136
($763,586)
7.8%
(17.8%)
3.45 (0.84)
1.97 (0.88)
2.08 (1.39)
$908,961
($968,385)
17.5%
(19.0%)
3.88 (0.69)
2.46 (0.76)
3.46 (0.97)
$1,498,373
($1,409,771
19.7%
(19.4%)
4.25 (0.72)
2.44 (0.88)
3.64 (0.91)
$1,948,696
($1,774,525
26.2%
(19.3%)
4.54 (0.67)
2.33 (0.86)
3.92 (0.76)
13.96
(p < 0.0005)
9.44
(p < 0.0005)
27.18
(p <0.0005)
2.21
(p > 0.05)
28.97
(p < 0.0005)
3.2 Descriptive Results - Budgeting
Approximately 6% (25) of farm establishments surveyed did not conduct any
planning, 31.8% (143) conducted some informal unwritten planning, 29.6% (133)
conducted some formal written planning, and 33.1% (149) conducted sophisticated
formal written planning (see Table 1). The predominant reason offered by farm
owners for conducting business planning was lender requirement (46.4%),
followed by owner requirement (26.1%), contractual requirements with buyers and
suppliers (3.3%), and “other” (19.5%). A univariate comparison of farm
establishments revealed significant differences (SIZE (F(417) = 13.96, p <0.0005)
and DEBT (F(435) = 9.44, p <0.0005)) in the expected direction for the two
measures capturing size and debt of the farm business (see Panel B, Table 2). As
hypothesized, the level of gearing (DEBT) was higher for farm businesses that
indicated Sophisticated Formal Written Planning ( %2.26X ) compared with
farms that indicated No Planning ( %8X ). With regard to farm size (SIZE),
group comparisons revealed farm establishments that conducted planning were
significantly larger than farm businesses that did not ( 696,948,1$X versus
136.802$X , respectively).
Internal locus of control (INLC) and operational uncertainty (ENUN1) were both
significantly associated with planning, F(416) = 27.18, p <0.0005) and
F(439) = 28.97, p <0.0005) respectively, but no significant difference was
observed for family conflict F(404) = 2.21, p > 0.05). These results suggest that
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farm owners with higher internal locus of control and those who perceive
increasing certainty in their operational business environment are significantly
more likely to use business planning procedure, and thus are more likely to demand
an audit compared with owners who conduct less sophisticated business planning,
whereas family conflict does not have an impact on their decision to conduct either
budgeting or auditing.
Finally, AUDIT was found to be significantly associated with planning, 2 (3,
N=450) = 19.49, p < 0.000), suggesting that planning and audit are complementary
monitoring mechanisms.
3.3 Logistic Regression Results – Audit
AUDIT with its respective predictors was subjected to a sequential logistic
regression analysis, first on the basis of size of farm and level of gearing, followed
by the addition of budget planning and family conflict. Table 3 presents the results.
An examination of the model on the basis of size of farm and level of gearing
indicates that the two predictors adequately distinguished demand for audit among
farm establishments, 2 (2, N=375) = 23.31, p<0.000. After addition of budget
planning and family conflict, model results were: 2 (4, 375) = 36.42, p < 0.000.
Comparison of log-likelihood ratios for the model with and without budgeting and
family conflict showed reliable improvement with the addition of the two variables,
2 (2, N = 375) = 13.12, p <0 .001. The overall correct classification rate for the
first two variables in the model was 66.7%, whereas with the addition of budgeting
and family conflict an overall classification rate of 71.0% was achieved.
According to the Wald criterion, LnSIZE and DEBT significantly predicted
voluntary demand for audit (z = 5.048, p < .001 and z = 8.966, p < .001,
respectively). With the addition of budgeting and family conflict in the model,
budgeting was significantly associated with voluntary demand for auditing
(z = 15.259, p < .0001), with LnSIZE and DEBT remaining significant (z = 4.10,
p < .05 and z = 8.292, p < .001, respectively).  This result confirms previous
findings as to the impact of enterprise size and debt on voluntary demand for
auditing (see Hope et al., 2012; Carey et al 2001; Blackwell et al 1998). However,
demand for auditing is further explained by the sophistication of a farm’s
budgeting processes. This result provides some support to the relevance of a
financial statement audit to an owner-manager and establishes the importance of
the internal management incentive as an explanation for voluntary demand for
auditing. (Table 3 shows regression coefficients and Wald statistics for each of the
predictors).
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Analysis of Voluntary Audit
AUDIT Est Coeff. S.E. Wald test(z-ratio)
STEP # 1
LnSIZE 0.252 .112 5.048***
DEBT 0.019 .006 8.966***
Constant Only Model -2 Log Likelihood = 481.89
Full Model -2 Log Likelihood = 458.59
Model Chi-Square 2 = 23.31, df = 2, p = .0000
“Pseudo” R2 = .09
STEP # 2
LnSIZE 0.3068 .0748 4.10*
DEBT 0.018 0.006 8.292**
FAMCONF 0.027 0.137 0.038
PLAN2a 15.259***
NO PLANNING 0.129 0.244 0.282
SOME INFORMAL -0.611 0.256 5.688**
SOME FORMAL -2.699 1.034 6.609**
CONSTANT -3.485 2.020 2.976
Constant Only Model -2 Log Likelihood = 481.89
Full Model -2 Log Likelihood = 445.47
Model Chi-Square 2 = 36.42, df = 4, p = .0000
Model Chi-Square 2 = 13.12, df = 2, p = .001
(Model Improvement)
“Pseudo” R2 = .09
*p < .05; **p < .01;*** p < .001
aPLAN2 is an ordinal variable.
3.4 Ordinal Logistic Regression Results – Budgeting
To better understand the planning process of farm owners, Budgeting with its
respective predictors was subjected to an ordinal logistic regression analysis on the
basis of seven background characteristics: Size of farm, level of gearing, internal
locus of control, operational uncertainty, family conflict, and audit. Table 4
presents the results. An examination of the model indicated that the predictors, as a
set, adequately distinguished demand for budget planning, 2 (6, N=346) = 133.26,
p < 0.000. An overall prediction rate of 75.0% for Budgeting was achieved.
According to the Wald criterion, LnSIZE and DEBT significantly predicted
demand for budgeting (z = 10.13, p < 0.0001 and z = 24.64, p < 0.0001,
respectively). Table 4 shows regression coefficients and Wald statistics for each of
the predictors. Internal locus of control and operational uncertainty were also
significantly associated with planning (z = 33.12, p < 0.0001 and z = 6.98,
p < 0.0001, respectively), but not family conflict (z = 0.25, p > 0.05). These results
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suggest that farm owners, who view themselves as having greater control over
changes in their operating environments and hold higher levels of certainty, are
more likely to conduct sophisticated business planning. Finally, AUDIT was found
to be significantly associated with planning (z = 5.67, p < 0.0001). The incentive
for an owner manager to voluntarily engage an external audit is explained by
incentives to budget.
Table 4. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis of Voluntary Budgeting
PLAN2 Est Coeff. S.E. Wald test(z-ratio)
Dependent Variable
NO PLANNINGa -1.280 0.967 1.751
SOME INFORMAL 11.080 2.040 29.512***
SOME FORMAL 12.797 2.067 38.316***
Covariates
LnSIZE 0.696 0.139 24.949***
DEBT 0.030 0.006 23.119***
INLC 0.932 0.164 32.511***
FAMCONF -0.062 0.135 0.212
ENUN1 0.332 0.147 5.080***
AUDIT -0.579 0.243 5.675***
Constant Only Model -2 Log Likelihood = 837.11
Full Model -2 Log Likelihood = 703.85
Model Chi-Square 2 = 133.26, df 6, p = .000
“Pseudo” R2 = .32
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
aAn ordinal variable with j categories requires a set of j – 1
dummy variables to capture all the distributional
information contained in the original set of distinctions.  The
rationale for including j – 1 dummy variables for a variable
of j categories follows directly from the requirements of the
classical regression model.  In particular, the presumption of
no perfect collinearity among independent variables requires
that none of the explanatory variables can be written as
perfect linear combination of remaining explanatory
variables in the model.  Thus, a variable with four categories
requires three dummy variables to represent all the
information contained in the original ordinal variable.  The
fourth category, which serves as the reference group, is
excluded from analysis.
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3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
A possible explanation for the association between AUDIT and PLAN2 is the
confounding and combined impact of LnSIZE and PLAN2 and DEBT and PLAN2
on voluntary audit. In untabulated analysis, additional analyses using logistic
regression with interaction effects (LnSIZE by PLAN2 and DEBT by PLAN2) on
AUDIT was conducted to ascertain the significance of this potential combined
effect. An examination of the interaction model demonstrates that the association
between voluntary audit and budgeting is not dependent on farm size (LnSIZE by
PLAN2, z = 2.610, p > 0.05) or debt (DEBT by PLAN2, z = 2.481, p > 0.05).
These results provide further confirmation that the sophisticated budgeting process
and voluntary demand for audit are complementary mechanisms, and that this
association is not confounded by the impact of farm size and debt on budgeting.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper develops and tests two models of voluntary demand for audit and
budgeting among a sample of farm owners in an unregulated environment. Results
from our demand for audit model are consistent with findings from prior empirical
research which demonstrates that demand for audit is positively associated with
farm size and debt (see Hope et al., 2012; Carey et al., 2001; Abdel-Khalik, 1993;
Blackwell et al., 1998; Chow, 1982). While controlling for contractual constraints
(i.e., Debt) and organisational characteristics (i.e., size), in an environment where
agency conflict is at a minimum, we find support for H1 that audit is positively
associated with budgeting. This relationship is consistent with audit enhancing
internal control by playing a complimentary monitoring role in the farm enterprise.
We find that farm owners who conduct more sophisticated business planning are
more likely to voluntarily engage an external audit compared with owners who
conduct less sophisticated business planning.
As most Australian farms are owned and managed by families, this study also
examined whether personal conflict between owner-managers explained demand
for auditing. Derived from predictions in agency theory, prior research has
conjectured that personal conflict between family members might provide further
incentive to engage the monitoring service of external audit. However, family
conflict does not have a significant impact on the farmer’s decision to conduct an
audit, thus providing no support for H2.
In addition, results from our demand for budgeting model show that budgeting is
not only positively associated with demand for audit (providing further support for
H1), but is positively associated with farm size, debt, the owner-manager’s internal
locus of control, and environmental uncertainty. These results suggest that owners
of larger farms who have a strong belief about their success and who perceive
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greater environmental certainty are significantly more likely to utilize sophisticated
business planning processes. This finding is in line with contingency theory,
suggesting that variables such as environmental uncertainty and firm size are
important variables for explaining voluntary budgeting.
While our study provides evidence that farm size, debt, and budgeting play an
important role in voluntary auditing, the antecedent conditions of voluntary
auditing and budgeting remain poorly understood. We recommend that further
research into voluntary auditing and budgeting should include an in-depth
examination of the internal processes of farm enterprises such as owners’
individual business skills, core human resource competencies or capabilities,
communication characteristics between generations, and the attitudes, values, and
goals of significant other family members.  Rigorous evaluation of these factors
will enable the development of fine-grained benchmarking and best-practice
resource-based models, which farm owners and professionals can use for
competitive advantage.
Findings should be considered in the light of the following limitations. While tests
of responses revealed that respondents are generally comparable to the ABS
population, respondents are under-represented in New South Wales as well as in
the wheat and other crops, and beef industries. The under-representation places
constraints on the generalizability of findings to these groups. Replication studies
are necessary to validate the present findings.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors acknowledge the helpful support of the Rural Industries, Research &
Development Corporation (RIRDC) for providing funding support (Project
No. UMO-20A).
REFERENCES
Abdel-khalik, A.R. (1993) “Why do private companies demand an audit? A case
for organizational loss of control”, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and
Finance, vol. 8: 31-52
Allee, K.D. & Yohn, T.L. (2009) “The demand for financial statements in an
unregulated environment: An examination of the production and use of
financial statements by privately held small businesses”, The Accounting
Review, vol. 84(1): 1-25
Alston, M. (1997) “Socio-cultural factors and family farming”, In J. Lees (Ed.), A
legacy under threat? Family farming in Australia, Armidale, NSW:
University of New England
Accounting and Management Information Systems
Vol. 12, No. 2230
Aram, J.D., & Cowen, S.S. (1990) “Strategic planning for increased profit in small
business”, Long Range Planning, vol. 23(6): 63-70
Argiles, J.M., (2001) “Accounting information and the prediction of non-farm
viability”, The European Accounting Review, vol. 10(1): 73-105
ABARES (2012) Agricultural commodity statistics 2012, Australian Bureau of
Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences, December, Canberra
AUS 202, (2004) Objective and General Principles Governing an Audit of a
Financial Report, Australian Auditing & Assurance Standards Board,
February 2004, Australian Accounting Research Foundation
Australasian Agribusiness Services (1997) Financial Performance of Australian
Broadacre Agriculture (RIRDC Research Paper 97/40). Kingston, ACT:
Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation (RIRDC)
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (1998) Small Business in Australia 1997
(1321.0), Canberra, ACT.: Australian Bureau of Statistics
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2003) Australian Social Trends, Living
Arrangements 2003, Cat.4102.0. Accessed 12.11.08.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2010) Agricultural Land and Water
Ownership (7127.0), December, Canberra
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2012) Labour Force Australia
(6291.0.55.003), November, Canberra
Begley, T.M., & Boyd, D.P. (1987) “Psychological characteristics associated with
performance in entrepreneurial firms and smaller firms”, Journal of Business
Venturing, vol. 2: 79-93
Blackwell, D.W., Noland, T.R. & Winters, D.B. (1998) “The value of auditor
assurance: Evidence from loan pricing”, Journal of Accounting Research
(Spring) vol. 36(1): 57-70
Bourgeois, L.J. (1980) “Strategy and Environment: a Conceptual Integration”,
Academy of Management Review, vol. 5(1): 25-39
Bourgeois, L.J. (1985) “Strategic Goals, Perceived Uncertainty, and Economic
Performance in Volatile Environments”, Academy of Management Journal,
vol. 28(3): 548-573
Bracker, J.S., & Pearson, J.N. (1986) “Planning and financial performance of
small, mature firms”, Strategic Management Journal, vol. 7: 503-522
Carey, P., Simnett, R., & Tanewski, G. (2001) “Voluntary demand for internal and
external auditing by family businesses”, Auditing: A Journal of Theory of
Practice, vol. 19(Supplement): 37-51
Chenhall, R.H. & Morris, D. (1993) “The Role of Post Completion Audits,
Managerial Learning, Environmental Uncertainty and Performance”,
Behavioral Research in Accounting, vol. 5: 170-187
Chow, C. W. (1982) “The demand for external auditing: Size, debt and ownership
influences”, The Accounting Review (April): 272-291
Chow, C. W., Kramer, L. & Wallace, W.A. (1988) “The Environment of auditing”,
in Abdel-khalik, A. R., & Solomon, I. (eds.) Research Opportunities in
Auditing: The Second Decade (AAA): 155-183
Voluntary demand for auditing by farm businesses: an Australian perspective
Vol. 12, No. 2 231
Horngren, C.T. (2011) Cost accounting: A managerial emphasis, Frenchs Forest,
NSW: Pearson Australia
Hope, O.-K., Thomas, W.B., & Vyas, D. (2011) “Financial credibility, ownership
nd financing constraints in private firms”, Journal of International Business
Studies vol. 42: 935-957
Hope, O.-K., Langli, J.C. & Thomas, W.B. (2012) “Agency conflicts and auditing
in private firms”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 37: 500-517
Indjejikian, R. & Matejka, M. (2009) “CFO fiduciary responsibilities and annual
bonus incentives”, Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 47: 1061-1093
Kaine, G., Lees, I., & Sandall, J. (1998) “Planning and strategy on family farms”,
Bond Management Review, vol. 5(2): 35-45
Lees, J. (1997) “The future of the family farm”, In J. Lees (Ed.) A legacy under
threat? Family farming in Australia, Armidale, NSW: University of New
England Press
Lindsay, W., & Rue, L. (1980) “Impact of the business environment on the long-
range planning process: A contingency view”, Academy of Management
Journal, vol. 23(3): 385-404
Lloyd, A. & Malcolm, B. (1997) “Agriculture and the family farm in the
economy”, In A Legacy Under Threat (ed. Lees, J.) Armidale, NSW:
University of New England Press
Matthews, C. H. (1991) “Planning sophistication and uncertainty: Assessing
financial performance in small firms and entrepreneurial firms”, Paper
presented at the Paper presented at the 36th World Conference of the
International Council for Small Business, Vienna
Matthews, C. H., & Scott, S. G. (1995) “Uncertainty and planning in small
entrepreneurial firms: An empirical assessment”, Journal of Small Business
Management, vol. 33(4): 34-52
Miller, D., Kets de Vries, M. & Toulouse, J. (1982) “Top executive locus of
control and its relationship to strategy-making, structure and environment”,
Academy of Management Journal, vol. 25(2): 237-253
Miller, D., & Toulouse, J. (1986) “Chief executive personality and corporate
strategy and structure in small firms”, Management Science, vol. 32(11):
1389-1409
Mintzberg, H. (1981) “What is planning anyway?”, Strategic Management
Journal, vol. 2: 319-324
Mintzberg, H. (1994) Rise and fall of strategic planning, New York: Prentice Hall
Noller, P., Seth-Smith, M., Bouma, R., & Schweitzer, R. (1992) “Parent and
adolescent perceptions of family functioning: a comparison of clinic and
non-clinic families”, Journal of Adolescence, vol. 15: 101-114
Pearce, J. A., Freeman, E. B., & Robinson, R. B. (1987) “The tenous link between
formal strategic planning and financial performance”, Academy of
Management Review, vol. 12(4): 658-675
Accounting and Management Information Systems
Vol. 12, No. 2232
Perrow, C.B. (1970) Organizational analysis: A sociological view, Belmont, CA.:
Wadsworth
Robinson, R. B. & Pearce, J. A. (1984) “Research thrusts in small firm strategic
planning”, Academy of Management Review, vol. 9(9): 128-137
Shield, M.D. (1997) “Research in management accounting by North Americans in
the 1990s”, Journal of Management Accounting Research, vol. 9: 3-61
Schwenk, C. R., & Shrader, C. B. (1993) “Effects of formal strategic planning on
financial performance in small firms: A meta-analysis”, Entrepreneurship,
Theory and Practice, vol. 17(3): 53-64
Tanewski, G., Romano, C. & Smyrnios, K. (2000) Determinants of Australian
Family Growth: The Role of Owner Characteristics and Strategic Planning,
A report for the Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation
(RIRDC), Canberra, RIRDC
Welsh, G., Hilton, R. and Gordon, P. (1988) Budgeting: Profit planning and
control, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall
Wright, V., & Kaine, G. (1997) “Economic and market forces influencing farm
land ownership”, In J. Lees (Ed.), A legacy under threat? Family farming in
Australia, Armidale, NSW: University of New England
Voluntary demand for auditing by farm businesses: an Australian perspective
Vol. 12, No. 2 233
APPENDIX A: Definitions of Variables
AUDIT was a dichotomous variable, where 1 = the farm business is subject to an
annual financial report audit, 0 = Otherwise;
LnSIZE8 is measured by the farm’s total assets, which includes land, buildings,
livestock, supplies and equipment. A transformed measure of farm size (using
the natural log) was included in the logistic regression analyses;
DEBT is a measure of the farm’s gearing, defined as proportion of a farm’s total
sales price retained after all debts had been paid;
PLAN2 is a composite variable comprising 6 items measured on an ordinal scale
with the following classification: No Planning, Some Informal Unwritten
Planning, Some Formal Written Planning, and Sophisticated Formal Written
Planning. Adapted from Matthews and Scott (1995), it assesses the extent
and sophistication of operational planning practiced by farm owners.
Examples of items are: Budgets are developed for cashflow and Budgets are
better developed for equipment purchases.  Internal level of consistency for
Budgeting is  = 0.87.
FAMCONF is a 10-item composite measure of family conflict, which primarily
gauges the extent of misunderstanding, interference, and difficulty in solving
problems and making plans within a family unit. Adapted from Noller et al.
(1992), items are measured on 6-point Likert scales ranging from 1=Totally
Disagree to 6=Totally Agree.  The reliability coefficient is  = 0.82.
INLC is a 7-item instrument that measures the farm owner’s internal locus of
control (e.g., Working out the strengths of my farm business in some detail
can often give me useful leads for the future).  Adapted from Kaine et al.
(1998), it assesses the degree of control people believe they have over their
environment, and relates to beliefs about behaviour, success, and failure. This
measure was specifically designed for mixed-farming operations such as
broadacre and dairy farming. Assessed on 6-point Likert scales ranging from
1=Totally Disagree to 6=Totally Agree, the internal consistency is  = 0.73.
ENUN1 is an 8-item measure, adapted from Matthews and Scott (1995: 41-42),
which assesses owners’ perceptions of environmental or state uncertainty.
That is, the ability of owners to understand or to predict the state of the
operational environment within the context of limited information.  Items
(e.g., obtaining resources such as equipment) are measured on 6-point Likert
scales ranging from 0=N/A; 1=Very Low Certainty to 5=Very High Certainty,
and the internal consistency of operational uncertainty is  = 0.82.
1 This optimal structure has endured despite the pressures of globalisation. However, the size and
scale of farms has increased dramatically due to technological innovation, particularly during the
latter part of the 20th century and into the 21st century.
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2 Abdel-khalik (1993: 35) argues that “in small companies with one level of hierarchy, the owner
(manager) controls operations primarily by means of direct supervision and personal observation”.
This conjecture suggests that auditing is unlikely among small owner managed organisations.
3 This is analogous to internal management demanding the services of an external audit as suggested
by Chow et al. (1988).
4 “Indeed, a primary function of external audits is to evaluate the quality and adequacy of internal
control systems” Abdel-khalik (1993: 37-38).
5 The audit also provides indirect assurance to the credibility of non-financial data. The audit process,
and in particular the new audit methodologies, place increasing reliance on non-financial
information as audit evidence. The auditor does not explicitly report on the credibility of non-
financial information, but in relying on non-financial information during the audit process there is
indirect assurance as to its credibility. The audit therefore complements the non-financial
dimension to profit planning and control.
6 The study of farm management practices was commissioned by the Rural Industries, Research &
Development Corporation (RIRDC).
7 Details of procedures used in the national study are reported in Tanewski et al. (2000).
8 Abdel-khalik (1993) uses employees as a proxy for firm size in non-agricultural enterprises.
However, in our agricultural sample approximately 50% of respondents indicated they did not
employ full-time employees and over 25% stated they only employed one full-time employee.
Moreover, farm businesses “typically [involve] two to three people” (Lloyd & Malcolm, 1997: 74)
and indeed most family farms tend to use only family members to contribute to the labour of the
enterprise (see Alston, 1997 and Lees, 1997).
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